Interaction indices for multichoice games by Ridaoui, Mustapha et al.
HAL Id: halshs-02353519
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02353519
Submitted on 7 Nov 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Interaction indices for multichoice games
Mustapha Ridaoui, Michel Grabisch, Christophe Labreuche
To cite this version:
Mustapha Ridaoui, Michel Grabisch, Christophe Labreuche. Interaction indices for multichoice games.
2019. ￿halshs-02353519￿
 
 
 
Documents de Travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction indices for multichoice games 
 
Mustapha RIDAOUI, Michel GRABISCH 
Christophe LABREUCHE 
 
 
2019.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13 
https://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/ 
ISSN : 1955-611X 
 
Interaction indices for multichoice games
Mustapha Ridaoui1, Michel Grabisch1, Christophe Labreuche2
1 Paris School of Economics, Universite´ Paris I - Panthe´on-Sorbonne, Paris, France
{mustapha.ridaoui,michel.grabisch}@univ-paris1.fr
2 Thales Research & Technology, Palaiseau, France
christophe.labreuche@thalesgroup.com
Abstract
Models in Multicriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) can be analyzed by means
of an importance index and an interaction index for every group of criteria. We
consider first discrete models in MCDA, without further restriction, which amounts
to considering multichoice games, that is, cooperative games with several levels of
participation. We propose and axiomatize two interaction indices for multichoice
games: the signed interaction index and the absolute interaction index. In a sec-
ond part, we consider the continuous case, supposing that the continuous model is
obtained from a discrete one by means of the Choquet integral. We show that, as
in the case of classical games, the interaction index defined for continuous aggre-
gation functions coincides with the (signed) interaction index, up to a normalizing
coefficient.
Keywords: multicriteria decision analysis, interaction, multichoice game, Choquet inte-
gral
1 Introduction
An important issue in MultiCriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) is to be able to analyze
and explain a numerical model, obtained by elicitation of preferences of the decision
maker. A classical way to do this is to assess the importance of each criterion (see a general
approach to define an importance index in (Ridaoui et al., 2017a)). This description of
the model may appear to be sufficient in the case of simple models, which are additive
in essence (e.g., additive utility models), as it is well known that they imply mutual
preferential independence of criteria (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). However, in case of more
complex models, the preferential independence among criteria does not hold any more,
and interaction appears among criteria, so that a description of the model by the sole
importance indices is not sufficient any more. For example, for models where aggregation
of preference is done through a Choquet integral w.r.t. a capacity, an interaction index is
defined for any group of criteria (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2010), which is a generalization
of the interaction index for pairs of criteria proposed by Murofushi and Soneda (1993).
Roughly speaking, a positive interaction index induces a conjunctive behavior (like the
1
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minimum operator), while a negative interaction index induces a disjunctive behavior
(maximum).
The aim of the paper is to propose an axiomatic foundation of an interaction index
for a MCDA model with no special restriction (and in particular, mutual preferential
independence is not supposed to hold). In a first step, the attributes are supposed to
be defined on a finite universe. Then, such a model is equivalent to what is called a
multichoice game in game theory (Hsiao and Raghavan, 1993), that is, a game on a set of
players N , where each player can play at a level of participation represented by an integer
between 0 and k. Up to our knowledge, there is no definition of an interaction index for
multichoice games. Nevertheless, there exists a general form of interaction index for
games on lattices (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2007), and multichoice games with k levels
can be considered as games on the lattice (k + 1)N . This interaction index is defined,
however, for any element of the lattice x ∈ (k+1)N , i.e., any profile of participation of the
players. This does not make sense for our purpose, since we are looking for an interaction
index defined for groups of players/criteria. It is the contribution of this paper to provide
two definitions for an interaction index, and to give a characterization of them. The first
one is a natural generalization of the interaction index for classical games, which we call
signed interaction index as it can take positive or negative values. The second one is
an absolute interaction index, because it cumulates only amounts of interaction without
considering its signs. The latter permits to avoid cancellation of local interaction effects,
yielding counterintuitive results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the necessary material and
notation. Section 3 summarizes previous works on the interaction index (the case of
classical games and the case of games on lattices). Our work on the importance index for
multichoice games is summarized in Section 4, since some of the axioms are necessary for
our approach. Section 5 and 6 give the main results of the paper, which are the definition
and characterization of two interaction indices for multichoice games, and consequently for
general discrete MCDA models. In Section 7, we address the continuous case, supposing
that the model is obtained from a discrete one via the Choquet integral.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, the cardinality of sets will be denoted by corresponding lower case
letters, i.e., |N | := n, |S| := s, etc. For notational convenience, we will omit braces for
singletons, i.e., S ∪ {i} is written S ∪ i, etc.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a fixed and finite set which can be thought as the set of
attributes or criteria (in MCDA), players (in cooperative game theory), etc., depending
on the domain of application. In this paper, we will mainly focus on MCDA applications.
We suppose that each attribute i ∈ N takes values in a set Li, which is supposed
to be finite1 and denoted by Li = {0, 1, . . . , ki}. The alternatives are represented as
elements of the Cartesian product L := L1 × . . .× Ln. An alternative is thus written as
a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) where xi ∈ Li for all i ∈ N . For each x ∈ L, we denote by
1The continuous case will be addressed in Section 7.
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S(x) = {i ∈ N | xi > 0} the support of x, and by K(x) = {i ∈ N |xi = ki} the kernel of
x.
For each i ∈ N , we denote by L−i the set ×j 6=iLj. For each y−i ∈ L−i, and any
` ∈ Li, (y−i, `i) denotes the compound alternative x such that xi = ` and xj = yj,∀j 6= i.
More generally, for any T ∈ 2N \ {∅}, for any x, y ∈ L, (xT , y−T ) denotes the compound
alternative, while LT and L−T denote the restricted Cartesian products of attributes.
The vector 0N = (0, . . . , 0) is the null alternative of L, and kN = (k1, . . . , kn) is the
top element of L. Similarly, we use the notation 0T , 1T , kT , etc., for any T ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
With some abuse, we also often make use of (k− 1)T ∈ LT as a shorthand for kT − 1T =
(ki− 1)i∈T . We write x ≤ y if xi ≤ yi for every i ∈ N , xT < kT if xT ≤ (k− 1)T , xT > 0T
if xT ≥ 1T and x  y if x ≤ y and x 6= y.
The preferences of a Decision Maker (DM) over the alternatives are supposed to be
represented by a function v : L → R. For the sake of generality, we do not make any
assumption on v, except that
v(0N) = 0. (1)
For convenience, we assume from now on that all attributes have the same number of
elements, i.e., ki = k for every i ∈ N (k ∈ N). Note that if this is not the case, we set
k = maxi∈N ki, and we extend v : L→ R to v′ : {0, . . . , k}N → R by
v′(x) = v(y) where yi = min(xi, ki) ∀i ∈ N.
This amounts to duplicating the last element ki of Li when ki < k. Under this assumption,
we recover well-known concepts.
When k = 1, v is a pseudo-Boolean function v : {0, 1}N → R vanishing at 0N .
Equivalently, it can be seen as a set function v : 2N → R, with v(∅) = 0, which is a game
in cooperative game theory. A capacity (Choquet, 1953) or fuzzy measure (Sugeno, 1974)
is a monotone game, i.e., satisfying v(A) ≤ v(B) whenever A ⊆ B. For the general case
(when k ≥ 1), v : L → R fulfilling (1) corresponds exactly to the concept of multichoice
game (Hsiao and Raghavan, 1993), and the numbers 0, 1, . . . , k in Li are seen as the
levels of activity of the players. A k-ary capacity (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2003) is a
multichoice game v satisfying the monotonicity condition: or each x, y ∈ L s.t. x ≤ y,
v(x) ≤ v(y) and the normalization condition: v(k, . . . k) = 1. Hence, a k-ary capacity
represents a preference on L which is increasing with the value of the attributes.
Consider the following example in which decision strategies depend on the values of
the attributes.
Example 1 (System engineers). Consider an engineering problem with two perfor-
mance criteria (e.g., the latency of the system and the quality of the system) evaluated
on the scale {0, 1, 2}, where 0 means that the performance is not met, 1 means that
the performance is medium, and 2 means that the performance is completely met. Con-
sider the following 2-ary capacity representing the overall satisfaction on the system (the
preferences are depicted in Figure 1):
∀x ∈ {0, 1, 2}2, v(x) =

x1 ∧ x2, if x ∈ {0, 1}2,
x1 ∨ x2, if x ∈ {1, 2}2,
x1 + x2 − 1, otherwise.
3
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For x ∈ {0, 1}2, the decision maker is not satisfied at all when one criterion is not met
at all, and the other one is at most medium. This corresponds to an intolerant behaviour.
On the other hand, for x ∈ {1, 2}2, the decision maker is completely satisfied when one
criterion is completely met and the other one is at least medium. This corresponds to a
tolerant behaviour.
X1
X2
Tolerance
Intolerance
No interaction
No interaction
0 1 2
1
2
Figure 1: Decision strategies.
Any multichoice game v can be written as:
v =
∑
x∈L\{0N}
mv(x)ux, (2)
where mv(x), x ∈ L, is the Mo¨bius transform of v (Rota, 1964) given by
mv(x) =
∑
y≤x
xi−yi≤1,∀i∈N
(−1)
∑
i∈N (xi−yi)v(y),
and ux is a multichoice game (called the unanimity multichoice game) defined by
ux(y) =
{
1, if y ≥ x
0, otherwise.
Note that the games ux, x ∈ L \ {0N}, are linearly independent, and form a basis of
the vector space of multichoice games. We denote by G(L) the set of multichoice games
defined on L, and G+(L) the set of multichoice games whose Mo¨bius transform is non-
negative. Any multichoice game v can be uniquely decomposed into v = v+ − v−, with
v+, v− ∈ G+(L).
4
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Another family of games which form a basis is the family of Dirac games, defined for
every x ∈ L \ {0N} by
δx(y) =
{
1, if x = y
0, otherwise.
This yields the decomposition
v =
∑
x∈L\{0N}
v(x)δx. (3)
The derivative of v ∈ G(L) at x ∈ L w.r.t. i ∈ N such that xi < k is defined by
∆iv(x) = v(x+ 1i)− v(x).
The derivative of v ∈ G(L) at x ∈ L w.r.t. T ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that ∀i ∈ T, xi < k is
defined recursively as follows,
∆Tv(x) = ∆i(∆T\iv(x)).
The general expression for the derivative of v ∈ G(L) is given by,
∆Tv(x) =
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−av(x+ 1A),∀T ⊆ N, xi < k, ∀i ∈ T.
Observe that ∆∅v = v. For T ⊆ N , we denote by GT (L) the set of multichoice games
whose derivative w.r.t. T and derivative w.r.t. any subset S ⊆ N \ T such that S 6= ∅
are nonnegative.
The following lemma gives a general expression for the derivative in terms of the
Mo¨bius transform.
Lemma 1. For any v ∈ G(L), any T ⊆ N , we have
∆Tv(x) =
∑
y−T≤x−T
mv(y−T , xT + 1T ), ∀x ∈ L, such that xi < k, ∀i ∈ T.
Proof. Let us proceed by induction on |T |. For |T | = 0, we have
∆∅v(x) = v(x) =
∑
y≤x
m(y), ∀x ∈ L.
Assume the formula holds for |T | = ` and let us prove it still holds for T ∪ {i} with
|T | = ` and i ∈ N \ T . We have, for any x ∈ L such that ∀j ∈ T ∪ {i}, xj < k,
∆T∪iv(x) = ∆Tv(x+ 1i)−∆Tv(x)
=
∑
y−T∪i≤x−T∪i
yi≤xi+1
mv(y−T , xT + 1T )−
∑
y−T∪i≤x−T∪i
yi≤xi
mv(y−T , xT + 1T )
=
∑
y−T∪i≤x−T∪i
( ∑
yi≤xi+1
mv(y−T , xT + 1T )−
∑
yi≤xi
mv(y−T , xT + 1T )
)
=
∑
y−T∪i≤x−T∪i
mv(y−T∪i, xT∪i + 1T∪i)
Let us remark that, if v ∈ G+(L) then its derivative w.r.t. any element is nonnegative
everywhere.
5
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3 Values and interaction indices
3.1 The case of classical TU-games
In cooperative game theory, the notion of value or power index is one of the most impor-
tant concepts. A value is a function φ : G(2N) → RN which assigns a payoff vector to
any game v ∈ G(2N). In MCDA, values are interpreted as importance indices for criteria.
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of player i ∈ N is given by
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
(
v(S ∪ i)− v(S)),∀v ∈ G(2N).
The concept of interaction index, which is an extension of that of value, was introduced
axiomatically to measure the interaction phenomena among players in cooperative game
theory or criteria in multicriteria decision analysis. For a game v ∈ G(2N), the interaction
index of v is a function Iv : 2N → R that assigns to every coalition T ⊆ N its interaction
degree.
Murofushi and Soneda (1993) proposed an interaction index I(ij) for a pair of elements
i, j ∈ N to estimate to which degree i and j interact. Grabisch (1997) defined and
extended the interaction index to coalitions containing more than two players. The
interaction index (Grabisch, 1997) of a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N in a game v ∈ G(2N)
is defined by
IvSh(S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
(n− t− s)!t!
(n− s+ 1)!
∑
K⊆S
(−1)s−kv(K ∪ T ). (4)
Note that when S = {i}, the interaction index coincides with the Shapley value. Moreover
that the expression is still valid for S = ∅, and represents in MCDA the average value
of the Choquet integral w.r.t. v over [0, 1]n. It is thus closely related to the so-called
“orness”.
A first axiomatization of the interaction index has been proposed by Grabisch and
Roubens (1999), and it is axiomatized in a way similar to the Shapley value. The following
axioms have been considered by Grabisch and Roubens :
• Linearity axiom (L): Iv(S) is linear on G(2N) for every nonempty S ⊆ N .
• Dummy axiom (D): For any v ∈ G(2N), and any i ∈ N dummy for v, Iv(S ∪ i) =
0,∀S ⊆ N \ i (i ∈ N is said to be dummy for v if ∀S ⊆ N \ i, v(S∪ i) = v(S)+v(i)).
• Symmetry axiom (S) : For any v ∈ G(2N), any permutation σ on N and any
nonempty S ⊆ N , Iv(S) = Iσv(σS).
• Efficiency axiom (E) : For any v ∈ G(2N) and any i ∈ N , ∑i∈N Iv(i) = v(N).
• Recursive axiom (R1): For any v ∈ G(2N) and any S ⊆ N, s > 1,
Iv(S) = Iv
−j
∪j (S \ j)− Iv−j(S \ j),∀j ∈ S,
where v−j is the game v restricted to elements in N \ j, defined by v−j(S) =
v(S),∀S ⊆ N \ j, and v−j∪j is the game on N \ j in the presence of j defined by
v−j∪j (S) = v(S ∪ j)− v(S),∀S ⊆ N \ j.
6
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• Recursive axiom (R2): For any v ∈ G(2N) and any S ⊆ N, s > 1,
IvSh(S) = I
v[S]([S])−
∑
K⊆N\S
K 6=∅,S
Iv
−K
(S \K),
where v[S] is the game where all elements in S are considered as a single element
denoted [S], and defined by, for any K ⊆ N \ S:
v[S](K) = v(K),
v[S](K ∪ [S]) = v(K ∪ S).
Axiom (R1) says that the interaction of the players in S is equal to the interaction between
the criteria in S \ j in the presence of j minus the interaction between the criteria of S \ j
in the absence of j. Axiom (R2) expresses interaction of S in terms of all successive
interactions of subsets. The authors have shown that (R1) and (R2) are equivalent under
(L), (D) and (S) axioms.
The following theorem was shown by Grabisch and Roubens (1999).
Theorem 1. The interaction index ISh given in (4) is the unique interaction index
satisfying axioms (L), (D), (D), (E), and ((R1) or (R2)) on G(2N).
3.2 The case of games on lattices
Grabisch and Labreuche (2007) generalized the notion of interaction defined for criteria
modelled by capacities, by considering functions defined on lattices. The interaction
(Grabisch and Labreuche, 2007) is based on the notion of derivative of a function defined
on a lattice. For this, they introduced the following definitions:
Let i = (0−j, ij) with ij ∈ Lj, j ∈ N . Let x, y ∈ L with y = ∨nk=1ik and v ∈ G(L).
The derivative of v w.r.t. i at point x ∈ L is given by:
∆iv(x) = v(x ∨ i)− v(x),
and the derivative of v w.r.t. y at x is given by:
∆yv(x) = ∆i1(∆i2(. . .∆inv(x) . . .)).
The following definition has been proposed in (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2007) :
Definition 1. Let J ⊆ N , and x = ∨j∈J ij, with ij = (0−j, `j), `j ∈ Lj \ {0}.
Iv(x) =
∑
y∈A(x)
αjh(y)∆xv(y),
where, A(x) = {y ∈ L|yj = k or 0 if j /∈ J, yj = xj − 1 else }, h(y) is the number of
components of y to k and αjh(y) =
(n−j−h(y))!h(y)!
(n−j+1)! .
7
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4 Characterization of the importance index for mul-
tichoice games
In this section, we present the importance index (value) for multichoice games defined by
Ridaoui et al. (2017b) together with its axiomatization. Let φ be a value defined for any
v ∈ G(L).
Linearity axiom (L) : φ is linear on G(L), i.e., ∀v, w ∈ G(L),∀α ∈ R,
φi(v + αw) = φi(v) + αφi(w),∀i ∈ N.
Let σ be a permutation on N . For all x ∈ L, we denote σ(x)σ(i) = xi. For all v ∈ G(L),
the game σ ◦ v is defined by σ ◦ v(σ(x)) = v(x).
Symmetry axiom (S): For any permutation σ of N ,
φσ(i)(σ ◦ v) = φi(v),∀i ∈ N.
Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider two games v, w ∈ G(L) such that, for
some i ∈ N ,
∆iv(x) = ∆iw(x− 1i), x−i ∈ L−i, xi ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}(mod k).
Then φi(v) = φi(w).
Note that the modulo means that for xi = 0, the condition reads
∆iv(x−i, 0i) = ∆iw(x−i, (k − 1)i).
Efficiency axiom (E): For all v ∈ G(L),∑
i∈N
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
xj<k
(
v(x+ 1N)− v(x)
)
.
Ridaoui et al. (2017a) have shown the following result.
Theorem 2. Let φ be a value defined for any v ∈ G(L). If φ fulfills (L), (I), (S) and (E)
then
φi(v) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
(
n− σ(x−i)− 1
)
!κ(x−i)!(
n+ κ(x−i)− σ(x−i)
)
!
(
v(x−i, ki)− v(x−i, 0i)
)
,∀i ∈ N (5)
8
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5 Axiomatization of the signed interaction index
In this section we intend to define axiomatically an interaction index for multichoice
games, which we call signed interaction index as it can take positive or negative values.
The approach presented here is based on a recursion formula, starting from the importance
index (value) defined in Section 4, as in (Grabisch and Roubens, 1999). An interaction
index of the k-ary multichoice game v ∈ G(L) is a function Iv : 2N \ {∅} → R.
The first axiom (L) is trivially generalized for the interaction index.
Linearity axiom (L) : Iv is linear on G(L), i.e., ∀v, w ∈ G(L),∀α ∈ R,
Iv+αw = Iv + αIw.
Proposition 1. Under (L), for every nonempty T ⊆ N , there exist real constants aTx ,
for all x ∈ L, such that for every v ∈ G(L)
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
aTx v(x). (6)
Proof . It is easy to check that the above formula satisfies the linearity axiom. Con-
versely, we consider Iv satisfying (L). Using the decomposition with Dirac games (3) and
(L), we get
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
v(x)Iδx(T ),∀T ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
Setting aTx = I
δx(T ), ∀x ∈ L,∀T ∈ 2N \ {∅}, we obtain the wished result.
Remark 1. Let i ∈ N be a null criterion for v ∈ G(L). We have,
∀T ⊆ N, T 3 i,∆Tv(x) = 0,∀x ∈ L, x+ 1T ≤ kT .
∀T ⊆ N, T 3 i,∆jv(x) = 0,∀j ∈ T,∀x ∈ L, x+ 1j ≤ k.
Null axiom (N): If a criterion i is null for v ∈ G(L), then for all T ⊆ N
such that T 3 i, Iv(T ) = 0.
Proposition 2. Under axioms (L) and (N), for every nonempty T ⊆ N , there exist real
constants bTx , for all x ∈ L, with x+ 1T ≤ kT , such that for every v ∈ G(L)
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx∆Tv(x). (7)
To prove this result, the following lemmas are useful.
Lemma 2. Let A ⊆ N .
a(xA,x−A) =
∑
C⊆A
(−1)a−c
kA∑
`C=xC
`A\C=(x+1)A\C
a(`C ,`A\C ,x−A),∀xA ∈ LA \ {kA}.
9
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Proof . Let A ⊆ N . We proceed by induction on |A|. The relation is obviously true for
|A| = 0. Let us suppose that the relation is true for any set A of at most l− 1 elements,
and try to show it is also true for any set A of l elements. We have , for all xA ∈ LA\{k}A,
a(xA,x−A) = a(xA\i,xi,x−A)
=
∑
C⊆A\i
(−1)a−c−1
kA\i∑
`C=xC
`A\C∪i=(x+1)A\C∪i
a(`C ,`A\C∪i,xi,x−A)
=
∑
C⊆A\i
(−1)a−c−1
kA\i∑
`C=xC
`A\C∪i=(x+1)A\C∪i
( k∑
`i=xi
a(`C ,`A\C∪i,`i,x−A) −
k∑
`i=xi+1
a(`C ,`A\C∪i,`i,x−A)
)
=
∑
C⊆A\i
(−1)a−c−1
( kA∑
`C∪i=xC∪i
`A\C∪i=(x+1)A\C∪i
a(`C ,`A\C∪i,`i,x−A) −
kA∑
`C=xC
`A\C=(x+1)A\C
a(`C ,`A\C∪i,`i,x−A)
)
=
∑
C⊆A\i
(
(−1)a−c−1
kA∑
`C∪i=xC∪i
`A\C∪i=(x+1)A\C∪i
a(`C ,`A\C ,x−A) + (−1)a−c
kA∑
`C=xC
`A\C=(x+1)A\C
a(`C ,`A\C ,x−A)
)
=
∑
C⊆A
(−1)a−c
kA∑
`C=xC
`A\C=(x+1)A\C
a(`C ,`A\C ,x−A)
Lemma 3.∑
x∈L
x<kN
bx
∑
A⊆N
(−1)n−av(x+ 1A) =
∑
A⊆N
0A<xA<kA
∑
B⊆N\A
C⊆A
(−1)a+b−cb(xA−1C ,0B ,(k−1)N\A∪B)v(xA, 0B, kN\A∪B)
Proof . We shall proceed by induction on n. For simplicity, we denote N \ i by S,
(xA, 0B, kS\A∪B) by xSA,B and (xA − 1C , 0B, (k − 1)S\A∪B) by xSA,C,B, with C ⊆ A. The
relation is obviously true for n = 1. Let us suppose that the relation is true for any set
of at most n− 1 elements, and try to show it is also true for any set of n elements. We
10
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have∑
x∈L
x<kN
bx
∑
A⊆N
(−1)n−av(x+ 1A)
=
∑
x∈L
x<kN
bx
∑
A⊆N\i
(−1)n−a(v(x+ 1A)− v(x+ 1A∪i))
=
∑
xi<k
∑
x−i∈L−i
x−i<k−i
bx−i,xi
∑
A⊆S
(−1)s−a(v(x−i + 1A, xi + 1)− v(x−i + 1A, xi))
=
∑
A⊆S
0A<xA<kA
xi<k
∑
B⊆S\A
C⊆A
(−1)a+b−cb(xSA,C,B ,xi)
(
v(xSA,B, xi + 1)− v(xSA,B, xi)
)
=
∑
A⊆S
0A<xA<kA
[ ∑
B⊆S\A
C⊆A
(
(−1)a+b−cb(xSA,C,B ,ki−1)v(x
S
A,B, ki) + (−1)a+b+1−cb(xSA,C,B ,0i)v(x
S
A,B, 0i)
)
+
∑
B⊆S\A
C⊆A
0<xi<k
(
(−1)a+1+b−cb(xSA,C,B ,xi)v(x
S
A,B, xi) + (−1)a+b−cb(xSA,C,B ,xi−1)v(x
S
A,B, xi)
)]
=
∑
A⊆S
0A<xA<kA
[ ∑
B⊆S\A
C⊆A
(
(−1)a+b−cb(xNA,C,B)v(x
N
A,B) + (−1)a+b+1−cb(xSA,C,B∪i)v(x
S
A,B∪i)
)
+
∑
B⊆S\A
C⊆A
0<xi<k
(
(−1)a+1+b−cb(xSA∪i,C,B)v(x
S
A∪i,B) + (−1)a+b−cb(xSA∪i,C∪i,B)v(x
S
A∪i,B)
)]
=
∑
A⊆S
0A<xA<kA
( ∑
B⊆N\A
C⊆A
(−1)a+b−cb(xNA,C,B)v(x
N
A,B) +
∑
B⊆S\A
C⊆A∪i
0<xi<k
(−1)a+1+b−cb(xSA∪i,C,B)v(x
S
A∪i,B)
)
=
∑
A⊆N
0A<xA<kA
∑
B⊆N\A
C⊆A
(−1)a+b−cb(xA−1C ,0B ,(k−1)N\A∪B)v(xA, 0B, kN\A∪B)
which is the desired result.
We now prove Proposition 2.
Proof . It is easy to check that the formula satisfies the axioms. Conversely, we consider
Iv satisfying (L) and (N). Let v ∈ G(L) and T ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
By Proposition 1, there exists aTx ∈ R, for all x ∈ L, such that,
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
aTx v(x).
Then,
Iv(T ) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
∑
xi∈Li
aT(x−i,xi)v(x−i, xi).
11
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Assume now that i is null for v. We have v(x−i, xi) = v(x−i, 0i). Hence,
Iv(T ) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
∑
xi∈Li
aT(x−i,xi)v(x−i, 0i).
By (N), we have, for all i ∈ T null, and for all x−i ∈ L−i,∑
xi∈Li
aT(x−i,xi) = 0.
∀x−T ∈ L−T , let A ⊆ T,B ⊆ T \ A, and set
bT(xA,0B ,(k−1)T\A∪B ,x−T ) = (−1)b
kA∑
`A=(x+1)A
aT(`A,0B ,kT\A∪B ,x−T ),∀xA ∈ LA \ {0, k}A.
Then, we have, ∀x−T ∈ L−T ,∀A ⊆ T,∀B ⊆ T \ A,∀xA ∈ LA \ {0, k}A,
aT(xA,0B ,kT\A∪B ,x−T ) =
∑
C⊆A
(−1)a−c
kA∑
`C=xC
`A\C=(x+1)A\C
aT(`C ,`A\C ,0B ,kT\A∪B ,x−T ) (using Lemma 2)
=
∑
C⊆A
(−1)a−c
kA∑
`C=(xC−1C)+1C
`A\C=xA\C+1A\C
aT(`C ,`A\C ,0B ,kT\A∪B ,x−T )
= (−1)b
∑
C⊆A
(−1)a−c(−1)b
kA∑
y=((x−1C)+1)A
aT(y,0B ,kT\A∪B ,x−T )
= (−1)b
∑
C⊆A
(−1)a−cbT(xA−1C ,0B ,(k−1)T\A∪B ,x−T )
Therefore, it suffices to replace the values of aTx in the formula (6), and then the result is
established.
Iv(T ) =
∑
x−T∈L−T
∑
xT∈LT
aT(xT ,x−T )v(xT , x−T )
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
∑
A⊆T
0A<xA<kA
∑
B⊆T\A
aT(xA,0B ,kT\A∪B ,x−T )v(xA, 0B, kT\A∪B, x−T )
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
∑
A⊆T
0A<xA<kA
∑
B⊆T\A
(−1)b
∑
C⊆A
(−1)a−cbT(xA−1C ,0B ,(k−1)T\A∪B ,x−T )v(xA, 0B, kT\A∪B, x−T )
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
∑
xT∈LT
xT<kT
bTx
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−av(x+ 1A) (using Lemma 3)
=
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−av(x+ 1A).
12
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2019.19
The next axiom generalizes the invariance axiom introduced for the importance index.
Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider two functions v, w ∈ G(L) and a
nonempty set T ⊆ N such that, for all i ∈ T ,
∆iv(x) = ∆iw(x− 1i), x−i ∈ L−i, xi ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}(mod k).
Then Iv(T ) = Iw(T ).
Proposition 3. Under axioms (L), (N) and (I), ∀v ∈ G(L), ∀T ∈ 2N \ {∅},
Iv(T ) =
∑
x−T∈L−T
bTx−T
∑
S⊆T
(−1)t−sv(0S, kT\S, x−T ).
Proof . It is easy to check that the above formula satisfies the axioms. Conversely, we
consider Iv satisfying (L), (N) and (I). Let v, w ∈ G(L) such that v, w satisfy the premise
of the Invariance axiom and consider T ∈ 2N \ {∅}. By Proposition 2, we have, for any
i ∈ T
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx∆Tv(x)
=
∑
x−i∈L−i
xT\i<kT\i
(
bT(0i,x−i)∆T\i∆iv(0i, x−i) +
∑
xi∈Li
xi /∈{0,k}
bTx∆T\i∆iv(x)
)
=
∑
x−i∈L−i
xT\i<kT\i
(
bT(0i,x−i)∆T\i∆iw
(
(k − 1)i, x−i
)
+
∑
xi∈Li
xi /∈{0,k}
bTx∆T\i∆iw(x− 1i)
)
=
∑
x−i∈L−i
xT\i<kT\i
(
bT(0i,x−i)∆T\i∆iw
(
(k − 1)i, x−i
)
+
∑
xi∈Li
xi<k−1
bTxi+1i,x−i∆T\i∆iw(x)
)
,
and,
Iw(T ) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
xT\i<kT\i
(
bT(
(k−1)i,x−i
)∆T\i∆iw((k − 1)i, x−i)+ ∑
xi∈Li
xi<k−1
bTx∆T\i∆iw(x)
)
.
Then, by (I), bTxi,x−i = b
T
xi+1i,x−i ,∀x−i ∈ L−i, ∀xi ∈ Li \ {k, k − 1} and any i ∈ T . Hence,
bTxT ,x−T = b
T
(x+1)T ,x−T , for all x−T ∈ L−T and for all xT ∈ LT such that xT < kT .
We conclude that the coefficient bTxT ,x−T does not depend on xT .
We set thus bTx−T := b
T
xT ,x−T . Hence, for any v ∈ G(L), and for any T ∈ 2N \ {∅}, we
have,
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx∆Tv(x)
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
bTx−T
∑
xT∈LT
xT<kT
∆Tv(x)
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
bTx−T
∑
S⊆T
(−1)t−sv(0T\S, kS, x−T )
13
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We introduce the Symmetry axiom.
Symmetry axiom (S): For all v ∈ G(L), for all permutation σ on N ,
Iσ◦v(σ(T )) = Iv(T ), ∀T ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
Proposition 4. Under axioms (L), (N), (S), ∀v ∈ G(L),∀T ∈ 2N \ {∅},
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bxT ;n0,n1,...,nk∆Tv(x), (8)
where bxT ;n0,n1,...,nk ∈ R, and nj = |{` ∈ N \ T, x` = j}|
Proof . Let v ∈ G(L) and let σ be a permutation on N . For every x ∈ L, we put
y = σ−1(x). From Proposition 2, we have ∀T ∈ 2N \ {∅}
Iv(T ) =
∑
y∈L
yT<kT
bTy ∆Tv(y),
and,
Iσ◦v(σ(T )) =
∑
x∈L
xσ(T )<kσ(T )
bσ(T )x ∆σ(T )σ ◦ v(x)
=
∑
y∈L
yT<kT
b
σ(T )
σ(y) ∆Tv(y).
Then, from the symmetry axiom, we have for all y ∈ L such that yT < kT : bσ(T )σ(y) = bTy .
For every y ∈ L such that yT < k, we can write,
bT(yT ;y−T ) = b
T
y = b
σ(T )
σ(y) = b
σ(T )
(σ(y)σ(T );σ(y)−σ(T ))
= b
σ(T )
(yT ;σ(y)−σ(T ))
Assuming that σ(T ) = T , then,
bT(yT ;y−T ) = b
T
(yT ;σ(y)−σ(T ))
For a fixed T 6= ∅, bT(yT ;σ(y)−σ(T )) depends only on n(y−T ), with n(y−T ) = {n0(y−T ), . . . , nk(y−T )},
and nj(y−T ) = |{` ∈ N \ T |y` = j}|.
pTyT ;y−T = p
T
yT ;n(y−T )
Suppose now that σ(T ) = S (with S 6= T ), and σ(`) = `,∀` ∈ N \ S ∪ T , then,
bT(yT ;n(y−T )) = b
σ(T )
(yT ;n(σ(y)−σ(T )))
= b
σ(T )
(yT ;n(y−T ))
we can conclude that the value bTyT ;n(y−T ) does not depend on the exponent T . We denote
by byT ;n(y−T ) this value.
14
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Proposition 5. Under axioms (L), (N), (I) and (S), for any v ∈ G(L) and any nonempty
T ⊆ N ,
Iv(T ) =
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
∑
S⊆T
(−1)t−sv(0T\S, kS, x−T ), (9)
where bn(x−T ) ∈ R, n(x−T ) = (n0, n1, . . . , nk) and nj = |{` ∈ N \ T, x` = j}|
Efficiency axiom (E): For all v ∈ G(L),∑
i∈N
Iv(i) =
∑
x∈L
xj<k
(
v(x+ 1N)− v(x)
)
.
We introduce now the Recursivity axiom which is the exact counterpart of the one
for classical games in (Grabisch and Roubens, 1999). For this, we introduce the following
definitions.
Let v be a multichoice game in G(L) and S ⊆ N . We introduce the restricted multi-
choice game v−S of v, which is defined on N \ S as follows
v−S(x−S) = v(x−S, 0S), ∀x−S ∈ L−S.
The restriction of v to N \ i in the presence of i, denoted by v−ii , is the multichoice game
on L−i defined by
v−ii (x−i) = v(x−i, ki)− v(0−i, ki),∀x−i ∈ L−i.
Recursivity axiom (R): For any v ∈ G(L),
Iv(T ) = Iv
−i
i (T \ i)− Iv−i(T \ i), ∀T ⊆ N, |T | > 1,∀i ∈ T.
Lemma 4. Under axioms (L), (N), (I) (S) and (R), for any v ∈ G(L), for any nonempty
T ⊆ N ,
Iv(T ) =
∑
A⊆T
A6=∅
(−1)t−aIv(−T )∪[A][A] ([A]), (10)
with v
(−T )∪[A]
[A] is the reduced multichoice game of v to T with respect to A defined on the
set {0, . . . , k}(N\T )∪[A] as follows:
v
(−T )∪[A]
[A] (x−T , `[A]) = v(x−T , `A, 0T\A), ` ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
Proof . We suppose that the axioms (L), (N), (I), (S) and (R) are satisfied. We
proceed by induction on |T | =: t. The formula is true for t = 1. Let us assume it is true
up to t = `− 1 ≥ 1, and try to prove it for t = ` elements. By induction assumption we
have, for any v ∈ G(L), and i ∈ T ,
Iv
−i
(T \ i) =
∑
A⊆T\i
A6=∅
(−1)t−a−1Iv(−T )∪[A][A] ([A]),
15
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Iv
−i
i (T \ i) =
∑
A⊆T\i
A6=∅
(−1)t−a−1Iv(−T )∪[A][A],i ([A]).
with v
(−T )∪[A]
[A],i (x−T , `[A]) = v(x−T , `A, ki, 0T\A∪i)− v(0−i, ki), ` ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
Let A ⊆ T \ i such that A 6= ∅. From Proposition 5,
Iv
(−T )∪[A]
[A],i ([A]) =
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v
(−T )∪[A]
[A],i (x−T , k[A])− v(−T )∪[A][A],i (x−T , 0[A])
)
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v(x−T , kA∪i, 0T\A∪i)− v(x−T , ki, 0T\i)
)
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v(x−T , kA∪i, 0T\A∪i)− v(x−T , 0T )
)
−
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v(x−T , ki, 0T\i)− v(x−T , 0T )
)
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v
(−T )∪[A∪i]
[A∪i] (x−T , k[A∪i])− v(−T )∪[A∪i][A∪i] (x−T , 0[A∪i])
)
−
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v(−T )∪i(x−T , ki)− v(−T )∪i(x−T , 0i)
)
= Iv
(−T )∪[A∪i]
[A∪i] ([A ∪ i])− Iv
(−T )∪i
(i).
By (R), we have
Iv(T ) = Iv
−i
i (T \ i)− Iv−i(T \ i)
=
∑
A⊆T\i
A6=∅
(−1)t−a−1Iv(−T )∪[A][A],i ([A])−
∑
A⊆T\i
A6=∅
(−1)t−a−1Iv(−T )∪[A][A] ([A])
=
∑
A⊆T\i
A6=∅
(−1)t−a−1
(
Iv
(−T )∪[A∪i]
[A∪i] ([A ∪ i])− Iv
(−T )∪i
(i)
)
−
∑
A⊆T\i
A6=∅
(−1)t−a−1Iv(−T )∪[A][A] ([A])
=
∑
A⊆T\i
A6=∅
(−1)t−a−1
(
Iv
(−T )∪[A∪i]
[A∪i] ([A ∪ i])− Iv
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A])
)
− Iv(−T )∪i(i)
∑
A⊆T\i
A6=∅
(−1)t−a−1
=
∑
A⊆T\i
A6=∅
(−1)t−a−1
(
Iv
(−T )∪[A∪i]
[A∪i] ([A ∪ i])− Iv
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A])
)
+ (−1)t−1Iv(−T )∪[i][i] ([i])
=
∑
A⊆T
A6=∅
(−1)t−aIv(−T )∪[A][A] ([A])
16
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Theorem 3. There is a unique interaction index satisfying (L), (N), (I), (S), (E) and
(R), which is the signed interaction index given by
Ivs (T ) :=
∑
x−T∈L−T
(n− s(x−T )− t)!k(x−T )!
(n− s(x−T ) + k(x−T )− t+ 1)!
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−av(0T\A, kA, x−T ),
for all v ∈ G(L), T ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
Proof . Let v ∈ G(L), and T ∈ 2N \ {∅}. By axioms (L), (N), (I), (S) and (E), we
have
Iv
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A]) =
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v
(−T )∪[A]
[A] (x−T , k[A])− v(−T )∪[A][A] (x−T , 0[A])
)
,
with bn(x−T ) =
(
n− t− s(x−T )
)
!k(x−T )!(
n− t+ 1 + k(x−T )− s(x−T )
)
!
.
By Lemma 4, we have
Iv(T ) =
∑
A⊆T
A6=∅
(−1)t−aIv(−T )∪[A][A] ([A])
=
∑
A⊆T
A6=∅
(−1)t−a
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v(x−T , kA, 0T\A)− v(x−T , 0T )
)
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
∑
A⊆T
A6=∅
(−1)t−a(v(x−T , kA, 0T\A)− v(x−T , 0T ))
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−av(kA, 0T\A, x−T ).
Observe that as for the interaction index for classical games, the formula is still valid
for T = ∅.
Example 2 (System engineers (continued)). Consider the 2-ary capacity v given in
Example 1. The computation of the signed interaction index w.r.t. v gives
Ivs ({1, 2}) = v(2, 2)− v(0, 2)− v(2, 0) + v(0, 0) = 2− 1− 1 + 0 = 0.
The signed interaction index indicates that there is no interaction among criteria. Evi-
dently, this is counterintuitive because the two criteria (latency of the system and quality
of the system) interact with one another, as depicted in Figure 1. This is because the
interaction effects existing in the subdomain {1, 2}2 of L cancel the interaction effects in
the subdomain {0, 1}2: interaction is positive in the latter, and negative in the former.
The above example motivates the introduction of another interaction index which does
not permit cancellation between positive and negative interaction, just by considering
absolute interaction effects. This is the object of the next section.
17
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6 Axiomatization of the absolute interaction index
In this section, we propose an axiomatic approach to define an interaction index which
has the following general form:
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx |∆Tv(x)|,
where, for any nonempty T ⊆ N , {bTx |x ∈ L, xT < kT} is a family of real coefficients. As
this index is not linear, the axiomatization scheme cannot be based on linearity as the
previous one, and we follow the scheme taken in (Ridaoui et al., 2017a) for the absolute
importance index. The two first axioms are a kind a replacement of linearity.
Conic Combination axiom (CC) : ∀v, w ∈ G+(L),∀α ∈ R+,
I(v+αw) = Iv + αIw.
Decomposition axiom (D): If v, w ∈ G+(L) and v − w ∈ GT (L) for some
T ⊆ N ,
Iv−w(T ) = Iv(T )− Iw(T ).
Proposition 6. Under axioms (CC) and (D), for all nonempty T ⊆ N , there exists
constants aTx ∈ R, for all x ∈ L, such that for all v ∈ GT (L),
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
aTx v(x). (11)
Proof. Let v ∈ G+(L). By using the basis of unanimity multichoice games and applying
(CC) we find for every nonempty T ⊆ N ,
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
mv(x)bTx , with b
T
x = I
ux(T ).
Since mv(x) is a linear combination of all coefficients v(y), y ∈ L, a rearrangement of
terms leads to the following formula:
Iv(T ) =
∑
y∈L
aTy v(y), (12)
where aTy are real constants independent from v. We have for every T ∈ 2N \ {∅} and
v ∈ GT (L),
Iv(T ) = Iv
+−v−(T ), v+, v− ∈ G+(L)
= Iv
+
(T )− Iv−(T ), by (D)
=
∑
x∈L
aTx v
+(x)−
∑
x∈L
aTx v
−(x), by (12)
=
∑
x∈L
aTx v(x).
18
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Marginal contribution axiom (MC): Let T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅ and v, w ∈ G(L)
such that
|∆Tv(x)| = |∆Tw(x)|,∀x ∈ L, xT < kT ,
then Iv(T ) = Iw(T ).
Remark 2. The Null Axiom (N) is implied by (CC) and (MC) (or (D) and (MC)).
Indeed, the (CC) axiom or (D) implies I0(T ) = 0 for any T ⊆ N , where 0 is the
null game, and if i is a null criterion for a multichoice game v such that T 3 i, then
∆Tv(x) = 0 = ∆T0(x), for every x ∈ L such that xT < kT . Hence, by (MC), Iv(T ) = 0.
Proposition 7. Under axioms (CC), (D) and (MC), for all nonempty T ⊆ N , there
exists constants bTx ∈ R, for all x ∈ L, xT < kT , such that for all v ∈ G(L),
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx |∆Tv(x)|. (13)
To prove this proposition, the following Lemma is useful.
Lemma 5. Let T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅. For every v ∈ G(L), there exists w ∈ GT (L), such that
|∆Tv| = |∆Tw|.
Proof . Let v ∈ G(L) and T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅. For any x ∈ L such that xT < kT , we set
D(x) =

∑
zT∈LT∀i∈T,zi<xi
|∆Tv(zT , x−T )|, if xi > 0,∀i ∈ T
0, otherwise.
Define inductively the following multichoice game w:
• w(0, . . . , 0) = 0,
• for every x−T ∈ L−T , x−T = (0A, x−T∪A), with A ⊆ N \ T ∪A and x−T∪A > 0−T∪A,
w(0T∪A, x−T∪A) = max∅6=B⊆N\T∪A
y−A∈L−A
0B<yB≤xB
[ ∑
zByB
zB≥yB−1B
(−1)1+
∑
i∈B yi−zi
(
w(0T∪A, zB, x−T∪A∪B)
+D(yT , 0A, zB, x−T∪A∪B)
)
−D(yT , 0A, x−T∪A)
]
,
• for every x ∈ L, such that xT 6= 0T ,
w(x) = w(0T , x−T ) +D(x).
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By construction, we have for every x ∈ L \ {0T} such that xT < kT ,
∆Tw(x) =
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−aw(x+ 1A)
=
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−a(w(0T , x−T ) +D(x+ 1A))
=
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−aD(x+ 1A)
=
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−a
∑
∀i∈A,zi≤xi
∀i∈T\A,zi<xi
|∆Tv(zA, zT\A, x−T )|
= |∆Tv(x)|,
and if x = (0T , x−T ), we have
∆Tw(x) = (−1)t−aw(0−T , x−T ) +
∑
∅6=A⊆T
(−1)t−aw(x+ 1A)
=
∑
∅6=A⊆T
(−1)t−aD(x+ 1A)
=
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−aD(x+ 1A).
Hence, w is a multichoice game such that ∆Tw(x) ≥ 0 and |∆Tv| = |∆Tw|.
Let now S ⊆ N \T, S 6= ∅, and x ∈ L such that xS +1S ≤ kS. Let A ⊆ N \T ∪S such
that x−T∪S = (0A, x−T∪S∪A) with x−T∪S∪A > 0, and we set `−T∪A = (xS + 1S, x−T∪A∪S).
We distinguish the two following cases:
• if xT = 0T , for every B ⊆ N \ T ∪ A,B 6= ∅, y−A ∈ L−A, 0B < yB ≤ `B, we have
w(0T∪A, `−T∪A) ≥
∑
zByB
zB≥yB−1B
(−1)1+
∑
i∈B yi−zi
(
w(0T∪A, zB, `−T∪A∪B)
+D(yT , 0A, zB, `−T∪A∪B)
)
−D(yT , 0A, `−T∪A),
we take B = S, yT = 0T and yS = xS + 1S, we obtain
w(0T∪A, xS + 1S, x−T∪A∪S) ≥
∑
zSxS+1S
zS≥xS
(−1)1+
∑
i∈S xi+1−ziw(0T∪A, zS, x−T∪A∪S)
• if xT 6= 0T , we have
w(xT , x−T + 1S) = w(0T , x−T + 1S) +D(xT , x−T + 1S),
and for every B ⊆ N \ T ∪ A,B 6= ∅, y−A ∈ L−A, 0B < yB ≤ `B, we have
w(0T∪A, `−T∪A) ≥
∑
zByB
zB≥yB−1
(−1)1+
∑
i∈B yi−zi
(
w(0T∪A, zS, `−T∪A∪B)
+D(yT , 0A, zB, `−T∪A∪B)
)
−D(yT , x−T + 1S),
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we take B = S, yT = xT and yS = xS + 1S, we obtain
w(xT , x−T + 1S) ≥
∑
zSxS+1S
zS≥xS
(−1)1+
∑
i∈S xi+1−zi
(
w(0T∪A, zS, x−T∪A∪S)
+D(xT , 0A, zS, x−T∪A∪S)
)
≥
∑
zSxS+1S
zS≥xS
(−1)1+
∑
i∈S xi+1−ziw(xT , 0A, zS, x−T∪A∪S).
Then, ∆Sv(x) ≥ 0.
We now prove Proposition 7.
Proof. Let v ∈ G(L) and T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅.
It is clear that Formula (13) satisfies (MC). Let us check that it satisfies (CC) and
(D). Let v, w ∈ G+(L), and T ∈ 2N \ {∅}. For any α ∈ R+, we have
I(v+αw)(T ) =
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx |∆T (v + αw)(x)|
=
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx |∆Tv(x) + α∆Tw(x)|
=
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx
(|∆Tv(x)|+ α|∆Tw(x)|) (by Lemma 1).
Thus
I(v+αw)(T ) = Iv(T ) + αIw(T ),
and the (CC) axiom is satisfied. If now v − w ∈ GT (L), we have ∆T (v − w) ≥ 0, and
then
I(v−w)(T ) =
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx |∆T (v − w)(x)|
=
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx∆T (v − w)(x)
=
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx
(|∆T (v)(x)| − |∆Tw(x)|).
Hence, (D) is satisfied. Conversely, we consider I satisfying the axioms (CC), (D) and
(MC).
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Let v ∈ G(L) and T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅, by Lemma 5 there exists w ∈ GT (L), such that
|∆Tv(x)| = |∆Tw(x)|, x ∈ L, xT < kT . By Remark 2 , I satisfies the Null axiom for any
multichoice game. Then we deduce by (11) and Proposition 2
Iw(T ) =
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx∆Tw(x),
And by axiom (MC) we have,
Iv(T ) = Iw(T )
=
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx∆Tw(x)
=
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx |∆Tv(x)|.
Proposition 8. Under axioms (CC), (D), (MC) and (I), for all v ∈ G(L),
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx−T |∆Tv(x)|, T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅.
(the proof works as in the case of Proposition 3)
Symmetry for Dirac games (SD): Let x ∈ L \ {0N}. ∀T ⊆ K(x) ∪
(
N \
Σ(x)
)
, with T 6= K(x) and T 6= N \ Σ(x),
Iδx(T ∪ i) = Iδx(T ∪ j),∀i, j ∈ K(x), i, j /∈ T,
Iδx(T ∪ i) = Iδx(T ∪ j),∀i, j ∈ N \ Σ(x), i, j /∈ T.
This axiom says that i, j ∈ N are symmetric for the Dirac games, if they are in the
kernel, or outside the support. It means that the interaction for Dirac games does not
depend on the labelling of the players in the kernel, or outside the support.
Take now x ∈ L \ {0N} such that κ(x) 6= 0 and remark that
∑
i∈N\T I
δx
s (T ∪ i) = 0
for any T ( K(x) ∪ (N \ Σ(x)), which implies∑
i∈K(x)
i/∈T
Iδxs (T ∪ i) = −
∑
i∈N\Σ(x)
i/∈T
Iδxs (T ∪ i).
We also note that Iδxs (T ∪ i) is positive for i ∈ K(x), i /∈ T , and Iδxs (T ∪ i) is negative for
i ∈ N \ Σ(x), i /∈ T . Hence∑
i∈K(x)
i/∈T
|Iδxs (T ∪ i)| =
∑
i∈N\Σ(x)
i/∈T
|Iδxs (T ∪ i)|.
This can be interpreted as the total interaction of elements in K(x) \ T is equal to the
total interaction of terms in N \ Σ(x) ∪ T. We then propose the following axiom.
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Absolute Efficiency (AE): Let x ∈ L \ {0N} such that K(x) 6= 0.
∀T ( K(x) ∪ (N \ Σ(x)), ∑
i∈K(x)
i/∈T
Iδx(T ∪ i) =
∑
i∈N\Σ(x)
i/∈T
Iδx(T ∪ i).
In all previous axioms, the Interaction is given up to a dilation coefficient. In order
to fix this coefficient, we introduce a calibration axiom taking the previous case when
Σ(x) = N .
Calibration (C): For every x ∈ L, such that Σ(x) = N ,∑
i∈K(x)
i/∈T
Iδx(T ∪ i) = 1,∀T ( K(x).
Theorem 4. There is a unique interaction index satisfying (CC), (D), (I), (MC),
(SD), (AE) and (C), which is the absolute interaction index given by
Iva (T ) :=
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
(n− σ(x−T )− t)!κ(x−T )!
(n− σ(x−T ) + κ(x−T )− t+ 1)! |∆Tv(x)|,
for all v ∈ G(L), T ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
Proof. It is clear that the above formula satisfies (CC), (D), (I), (MC). We show that
Ia satisfies (SD), (AE) and (C). Let x ∈ L \ {0N} and T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅, and for any
i ∈ N \ T , we set px−T∪i = (n−σ(x−T∪i)−t−1)!κ(x−T∪i)!
(n−σ(x−T∪i)+κ(x−T∪i)−t)! .
• Suppose T ⊆ K(x) ∪ (N \ Σ(x)) with T 6= K(x) and T 6= N \ Σ(x). For any
i, j ∈ K(x) such that i, j /∈ T , we have
Iδxa (T ∪ i) =
∑
y∈L
yT∪i<kT∪i
py−T∪i|∆T∪iδx(y)|
= px−T∪i
∑
yT<kT
∣∣∣∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−aδx(yT + 1A, ki, x−T∪i)
∣∣∣
= px−T∪j
∑
yT<kT
∣∣∣∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−aδx(yT + 1A, kj, x−T∪j)
∣∣∣
=
∑
y∈L
yT∪j<kT∪j
py−T∪j |∆T∪jδx(y)|
= Iδxa (T ∪ j),
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and for any i, j ∈ N \ Σ(x), we have
Iδxa (T ∪ i) = px−T∪i
∑
yT<kT
∣∣∣∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−aδx(yT + 1A, 0i, x−T∪i)
∣∣∣
= px−T∪j
∑
yT<kT
∣∣∣∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−aδx(yT + 1A, 0j, x−T∪j)
∣∣∣
=
∑
y∈L
yT∪j<kT∪j
py−T∪j |∆T∪jδx(y)|
= Iδxa (T ∪ j).
Hence, (SD) is satisfied.
• If κ(x) 6= 0, and T ( K(x) ∪ (N \ Σ(x)), we have
I
δ(ki,x−i)
a (T ∪ i) = px−T∪i ,∀i ∈ K(x), i /∈ T
I
δ(0i,x−i)
a (T ∪ i) = px−T∪i ,∀i ∈ N \ Σ(x), i /∈ T.
We set S = Σ(x) \K(x), and xT = (0A, kT\A), with A ⊆ T . We have∑
i∈K(x)
i/∈T
I
δ(ki,x−i)
a (T ∪ i) =
∑
i∈K(x)
i/∈T
(n− κ(x)− a− s)!(κ(x) + a− t− 1)!
(n− s− t)!
=
(n− κ(x)− a− s)!(κ(x) + a− t)!
(n− s− t)! ,
=
∑
i∈N\Σ(x)
i/∈T
(n− κ(x)− a− s− 1)!(κ(x) + a− t)!
(n− s− t)!
=
∑
i∈N\Σ(x)
i/∈T
I
δ(0i,x−i)
a (T ∪ i).
Then, (AE) is satisfied.
• Let us take Σ(x) = N . For any T ( K(x), we have∑
i∈K(x)
i/∈T
I
δ(ki,x−i)
a (T ∪ i) =
∑
i∈K(x)
i/∈T
px−T∪i
=
∑
i∈K(x)
i/∈T
1
k(x−T∪i) + 1
= 1.
Hence, (C) is satisfied.
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Conversely, we consider I satisfying the axioms (CC), (D), (I), (MC), (SD), (AE)
and (C). Let x = (0N\S∪M , xS, kM) ∈ L with xS ∈ LS \ {0, k}S, S = Σ(x) \ K(x) and
M = K(x).
By Proposition 8, we have for any T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅
Iδx(T ) = bTx−T
∑
yT∈LT
yT<kT
|∆T δx(x−T , yT )|.
Then we obtain,
• if T ∩ S = ∅,
Iδ(x−T ,kT )(T ) = Iδ(x−T ,0T )(T ) = bTx−T = I
δ(x−T ,`T )(T ),∀` ∈ {0, k}, (14)
• if T ∩ S 6= ∅,
Iδx(T ) = 2|T∩S|Iδ(x−T ,kT )(T ). (15)
Then it suffices to determine Iδ(x−T ,kT )(T ), with T ⊆M , T 6= ∅, and x−T = (0N\S∪M , xS, kM\T ).
• If S ∪M = N , by axioms (SD) and (C), we have
Iδx(T ) =
1
m− t+ 1 ,∀T ⊆M,T 6= ∅. (16)
• If S ∪ M 6= N , by axioms (SD) and (AE), we have, ∀t ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} and
∀m ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},∀s ∈ {1, . . . , n− 2} with s+m < n,
(m− t)Iδ(0N\M∪S,xS,kM\T∪i,kT∪i)(T ∪ i) = (n− s−m)Iδ(0j ,0N\M∪S∪j ,xS,kM\T ,kT )(T ∪ j)
and by (14), we obtain
I
δ(0N\M∪S,xS,kM\T∪i,kT∪i)(T ∪ i) = n− s−m
m− t I
δ(0N\M∪S∪j ,xS,kM\T ,kT∪j)(T ∪ j)
Thus, recursively,
I
δ(0−M∪S,xS,kM\T∪i,kT∪i)(T ∪ i) = n− s−m
m− t I
δ(0−M1∪S,xS,kM1\T∪j ,kT∪j)(T ∪ j),M1 = M ∪ j
I
δ(0−M1∪S,xS,kM1\T∪i,kT∪i)(T ∪ i) = n− s−m− 1
m+ 1− t I
δ(0−M2∪S,xS,kM2\T∪j ,kT∪j)(T ∪ j),M2 = M1 ∪ j
I
δ(0−M2∪S,xS,kM2\T∪i,kT∪i)(T ∪ i) = n− s−m− 2
m+ 2− t I
δ(0−M3∪S,xS,kM3\T∪j ,kT∪j)(T ∪ j),M3 = M2 ∪ j
I
δ(0−M3∪S,xS,kM3\T∪i,kT∪i)(T ∪ i) = n− s−m− 3
m+ 3− t I
δ(0−M4∪S,xS,kM4\T∪j ,kT∪j)(T ∪ j),M4 = M3 ∪ j
...
I
δ(0j ,xS,kMn−s−1\T∪i,kT∪i)(T ∪ i) = 1
n− s− 1− tI
δ(xS,kMn−s\T∪j ,kT∪j)(T ∪ j),Mn−s = Mn−s−1 ∪ j
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Then by (16), we obtain
I
δ(0−M∪S,xS,kM\T∪i,kT∪i)(T ∪ i) = (n− s−m)!(m− t− 1)!
(n− s− t)! ,
therefore, for any T ⊆M,T 6= ∅,
Iδx(T ) =
(n− s−m)!(m− t)!
(n− s− t+ 1)!
=
(n− σ(x))!(κ(x)− κ(xT ))!
(n− σ(x) + κ(x)− t+ 1)!
=
(n− t− σ(x−T ))!(κ(x−T ))!
(n− σ(x−T ) + κ(x−T )− t+ 1)!
Note that, alike the signed interaction index, the expression is still valid for T = ∅.
Example 3 (System engineers (continued)). Consider the 2-ary capacity v given in
Example 1. The computation of the absolute interaction index w.r.t. v gives
Iva ({1, 2}) = |∆{1,2}v(0, 0)|+|∆{1,2}v(0, 1)|+|∆{1,2}v(1, 0)|+|∆{1,2}v(1, 1)| = 1+0+0+1 = 2.
The absolute interaction index shows that there is a synergy of information between
criteria, which was not visible using the signed interaction index.
7 Interaction indices for the Choquet integral
We propose in this section an interpretation of the interaction in continuous spaces, that
is, after extending v to the continuous domain [0, k]N . The most usual extension of v on
[0, k]N is the Choquet integral with respect to k-ary capacities (Grabisch and Labreuche,
2003).
Let z ∈ [0, k]N . For any i ∈ N , we define z ∈ L by zi ≤ zi < zi + 1 if zi < k and
zi = k− 1 otherwise. The Choquet integral w.r.t. a k-ary capacity v at point z is defined
by
Cv(z) = v(z) + Cµz(z − z),
where µz is a capacity given by
µz(A) = v((z + 1)A, z−A)− v(z), ∀A ⊂ N.
For any T ⊆ N , we define inductively the variation of Cv at z w.r.t. T by
∆∅Cv(z) = Cv(z)
∆iCv(z) = Cv(ki, z−i)− Cv(0i, z−i), ∀i ∈ N
∆T∪iCv(z) = ∆i(∆TCv(z)),∀i ∈ N \ T.
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Generalizing the above definitions, the variation of Cv at z w.r.t. T is
∆TCv(z) =
∑
S⊆T
(−1)sCv(0S, kT\S, z−T ).
We begin by giving a formula relating the (signed) interaction index to the interaction
index for classical games. In the formula below, as well as in the whole section, we consider
the expression of the interaction index extended to 2N .
Proposition 9. For every v ∈ G(L),
Ivs (T ) =
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
IµxSh(T ), ∀T ⊆ N,
where ISh is the interaction index for classical games given in (4).
To prove this result, the following combinatorial result is useful.
Lemma 6. ∑
S∈[A,B]
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
=
(n− b− 1)!a!
(n− b+ a)! , ∀A,B ⊆ N,A ⊆ B,
where [A,B] = {C ⊆ N : A ⊆ C ⊆ B}.
Proof . Let A,B ⊆ N , such that A ⊆ B,∑
S⊆[A,B]
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
=
∑
S⊆[∅,B\A]
(n− s− a− 1)!(s+ a)!
n!
=
b−a∑
s=0
(
b− a
s
)
(n− s− a− 1)!(s+ a)!
n!
=
b−a∑
s=0
(
b− a
s
)∫ 1
0
xn−s−a−1(1− x)s+a dx
=
∫ 1
0
xn−b−1(1− x)a
b−a∑
s=0
(
b− a
s
)
xb−a−s(1− x)s dx
=
∫ 1
0
xn−b−1(1− x)a dx
=
(n− b− 1)!a!
(n− b+ a)!
We now prove Proposition 9.
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Proof . Let T ⊆ N .∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
IµxSh(T ) =
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
∑
S⊆N\T
(n− s− t)!s!
(n− t+ 1)! ∆Tµx(S)
=
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
∑
S⊆N\T
(n− s− t)!s!
(n− t+ 1)! ∆Tv(x+ 1S)
=
∑
z∈L
zT<kT
∆Tv(z)
∑
S⊆N\T
∀j∈S,zj>0
∀j∈N\S,zj<k
(n− s− t)!s!
(n− t+ 1)!
=
∑
z∈L
zT<kT
∆Tv(z)
∑
S⊆N\T∩S(z−T )
S⊇K(z−T )
(n− s− t)!s!
(n− t+ 1)!
=
∑
z∈L
zT<kT
∆Tv(z)
∑
S⊆S(z−T )
S⊇K(z−T )
(n− s− t)!s!
(n− t+ 1)!
=
∑
z∈L
zT<kT
(n− s(z−T )− t)!k(z−T )!
(n− s(z−T ) + k(z−T )− t+ 1)!∆Tv(z).
Thus, the signed interaction index on L takes the form of the sum over all the cells of
the grid L, where in each cell the interaction index for the local (classical) game is taken.
Theorem 5. Let v be a k-ary capacity.
Ivs (T ) =
1
kt
∫
[0,k]n
∆TCv(z) dz,∀T ⊆ N.
To prove this result, the following lemmas are useful.
Lemma 7. The Choquet integral at point z ∈ [0, k]N w.r.t. a unanimity multichoice
game ux, x ∈ L is given by
Cux(z) =

1, if z ≥ x∧
i∈N :zi<xi
(zi − zi), if ∃i ∈ N : zi < xi, z−i ≥ x−i − 1−i
0, otherwise
Proof. Let ux, x ∈ L a unanimity multichoice game, and let z ∈ [0, k]N . There are three
different cases,
• Case 1 : x ≤ z,
we have vx(z) = 1, and µz(A) = 0 for any A ⊂ N , then Cvx(z) = 1.
• Case 2 : ∃i ∈ N such that xi > zi + 1,
we have vx(z) = 0 et µz(A) = 0 for any A ⊂ N , then Cvx(z) = 0.
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• Case 3 : ∃i ∈ N such that xi > zi,
we have vx(z) = 0 and µz(A) = µS(A) for any A ⊂ N , with µS a unanimity capacity
and S = {i ∈ N : xi > zi}, then Cvx(z) =
∧
i∈S
(zi − zi).
Lemma 8. For any v ∈ G(L), any T ⊆ N , we have
∆TCv(z) =
∑
S⊆N\T
∑
x∈L,xT≥1T
xS=(z+1)S
xN\T∪S≤zN\T∪S
mv(x)
∧
i∈S
(zi − zi).
Proof. Let z ∈ [0, k]N , ∀T ⊆ N and ∀L ⊆ T , we have by linearity of the Choquet integral
w.r.t. games, by Lemma 7 and (2),
Cv(0L, kT\L, z−T ) =
∑
x∈L
xL=0L
x−T≤z−T
mv(x) +
∑
x∈L
xL≤1L
x−T≤(z+1)−T
∃i∈N\(T\L):
xi>(0L,z−T )i
mv(x)
∧
i∈N\(T\L):
xi>(0L,z−T )i
(0T , z−T − z−T )i.
Letting φi = (0T , z−T − z−T )i, we have∑
x∈L
xL≤1L
x−T≤(z+1)−T
∃i∈N\(T\L):
xi>(0L,z−T )i
mv(x)
∧
i∈N\T :
xi>zi
φi =
∑
x∈L
xL=0L
x−T≤(z+1)−T
∃i∈N\T :xi>zi
mv(x)
∧
i∈N\T :
xi>zi
φi +
∑
x∈L
xL≤1L
xL 6=0L
x−T≤(z+1)−T
mv(x)
∧
i∈N\T :
xi>zi
φi ∧
∧
j∈L
φj
=
∑
x∈L
xL=0L
x−T≤(z+1)−T
∃i∈N\T :xi>zi
mv(x)
∧
i∈N\T :xi>zi
(zi − zi).
Then,
Cv(0L, kT\L, z−T ) =
∑
x∈L
xL=0L
x−T≤z−T
mv(x) +
∑
x∈L
xL=0L
x−T≤(z+1)−T
∃i∈N\T :xi>zi
mv(x)
∧
i∈N\T :
xi>zi
(zi − zi).
We use the following expression
∀T ⊆ N,
∑
A⊆T
(−1)|A|
∑
xA=0A
xT\A∈LT\A
m(x) =
∑
xT∈LT
xT≥1T
m(x),∀x−T ∈ L−T ,
29
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2019.19
and the definition of ∆TCv. We get:
∆TCv(z) =
∑
x∈L
xT≥1T
x−T≤z−T
mv(x) +
∑
x∈L
xT≥1T
x−T≤(z+1)−T
∃i∈N\T :xi>zi
mv(x)
∧
i∈N\T :
xi>zi
(zi − zi)
=
∑
x∈L
xT≥1T
x−T≤z−T
mv(x) +
∑
S⊆N\T
S 6=∅
∑
x∈L,xT≥1T
xS=(z+1)S
xN\T∪S≤zN\T∪S
mv(x)
∧
i∈S
(zi − zi),
the lemma is proved.
We now prove Theorem 5.
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Proof . Let v a k-ary capacity. For every T ⊆ N , we have,∫
[0,k]n
∆TCv(z) dz =
∑
x∈L
∀i∈N,xi<k
∑
S⊆N\T
∑
y∈L,yT≥1T
yS=xS+1S
yN\T∪S≤xN\T∪S
mv(y)
∫
[x,x+1N ]n
∧
i∈S
(zi − xi) dz
=
∑
x∈L
∀i∈N,xi<k
∑
S⊆N\T
∑
y∈L,yT≥1T
yS=xS+1S
yN\T∪S≤xN\T∪S
mv(y)
∫
[0,1]n
∧
i∈S
zi dz
=
∑
x∈L
∀i∈N,xi<k
∑
S⊆N\T
∑
y−S∈L−S
yT≥1T
yN\T∪S≤x−T∪S
mv(xS + 1S, yT , y−T∪S)
s+ 1
= kt
∑
x−T∈L−T
∀i∈N\T,xi<k
∑
S⊆N\T
∑
y−S∈L−S
yT≥1T
yN\T∪S≤x−T∪S
mv(xS + 1S, yT , y−T∪S)
s+ 1
= kt
∑
x∈L
∀i∈N,xi<k
∑
S⊆N\T
∑
y−T∪S∈L−T∪S
y−T∪S≤x−T∪S
mv(xT∪S + 1T∪S, y−T∪S)
s+ 1
= kt
∑
x∈L
∀i∈N,xi<k
∑
S⊆N\T
∆T∪Sv(x)
s+ 1
(by Lemma (1))
= kt
∑
x∈L
∀i∈N,xi<k
∑
S⊆N\T
∑
A⊆T∪S
(−1)t+s−av(x+ 1A)
s+ 1
= kt
∑
x∈L
∀i∈N,xi<k
∑
S⊆N\T
∑
A⊆T∪S
(−1)t+s−av(x+ 1A)− (−1)t+s−av(x)
s+ 1
= kt
∑
x∈L
∀i∈N,xi<k
∑
S⊆N\T
∑
A⊆T∪S
(−1)t+s−aµx(A)
s+ 1
= kt
∑
x∈L
∀i∈N,xi<k
∑
S⊆N\T
1
s+ 1
mµx(T ∪ S).
We use the expression of interaction index for capacities in terms of the Mobius repre-
sentation (Grabisch et al., 2000), and by Proposition (9), we get∫
[0,k]n
∆TCv(z) dz = ktIvs (T ).
The interaction index on continous domain appears as the mean of relative amplitude
of the range of Cv w.r.t. T , when the remaining variables take uniformly random values.
The total variation is the local interaction of Cv at point z.
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Example 4 (System engineers (continued)). Consider the 2-ary capacity v given in
Example 1. By applying the formula of Theorem 5 we find 0, and therefore the theorem
is satisfied in the example.
Remark 3. It is interesting to compare the expression of the interaction index obtained
in Theorem 5 with the general expression of the interaction index for an arbitrary aggre-
gation function F defined on some domain [a, b]n and taking value in [a, b] (see (Grabisch
et al., 2009, Sec. 10.4)):
IT (F ) =
1
(b− a)n
∫
[a,b]n
∆TF (x)
b− a dx,
where T ⊆ N and ∆TF (x) is the total variation of F w.r.t. T at x, defined by
∆TF (x) =
∑
S⊆T
(−1)sF (aS, bT\S, x−T ).
Applying this formula to F = Cv on [0, k]n we find:
IT (Cv) = 1
kn+1
∫
∆TCv(x) dx = 1
kn−t+1
Ivs (T ).
The difference in the normalizing coefficient comes from the axioms we have chosen,
essentially the efficiency axiom. Indeed, it is possible to recover exactly IT (Cv) if in
the efficiency axiom (E), we divide the right hand side of the equality by kn (this would
express an efficiency or average variation per cell in the grid, compared to a total variation
on the grid), and in the recursivity axiom (R), we multiply by k the right hand side (since
it concerns games with n− 1 players).
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